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Abstract 
 
A United Kingdom (UK) parliamentary seat is commonly referred to as ‘marginal’ if the 
majority is less than 10% of votes cast thus rendering the seat vulnerable on a swing of 
5%. This paper investigates whether the spending behaviour of MPs on selected 
constituency service expenditure categories can offer insights on what constitutes a 
‘marginal’ seat within the UK ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system.  The possible 
existence of a non-linear relationship between the expense claims of MPs and the size of 
the constituency majority provides the basis for such an insight.  This paper thus 
investigates the empirical nature of this non-linear relationship using separate 
specifications based on quadratic and piece-wise linear splines in constituency majority 
size.  The empirical analysis reported for the behavior of MPs appears broadly consistent 
with the conventional definition used to classify a ‘marginal’ constituency in the UK.                                
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 1 
Introduction  
 
The publication of detailed accounts relating to the expense claims of United Kingdom 
(UK) parliamentarians in October 2004 attracted significant media attention and 
generated some adverse public comment.
1
  Members of Parliament (MPs) defend the 
incidence and scale of the claims arguing that such expenses are essential in delivering an 
effective level of constituency service – a feature of their workload that has been growing 
in importance since the mid-1960s (see Norton and Wood (1993, p.41) and Barker and 
Rush (1970)).  The published data on the expenses of MPs have recently been used to 
investigate the key determinants of such discretionary expense claims focusing on the 
role of individual and constituency characteristics and offering inferences on taxpayer 
value for money (see Besley and Larcinese (2005)).       
 
The data on expense claims for MPs, however, are potentially useful in other respects.  
For instance, they could reflect the rational behaviour of MPs and may thus be 
informative, for example, on the „marginal‟ or „safe‟ status of a parliamentary seat.  
Although it is possible to label Westminster seats as „marginal‟ or „safe‟ according to the 
length of time they have been continuously held by the same political party
2
, it has 
become conventional to classify a parliamentary seat in Britain as „marginal‟ if the 
winner‟s majority is less than 10% of the votes cast thus rendering it vulnerable on a 5% 
swing.
3
     
 
There is a literature for the UK that examines the relationship between the disbursement 
of central government and local authority grants and marginal constituencies (for 
example, see Ward and John (1999) and John and Ward (2001)).  However, there has 
been hitherto, given a lack of relevant data, no research for the UK that explicitly 
examines the relationship between expenditure behaviour at the level of the individual 
                                                 
1
 For example, see the findings of the YouGov poll carried out for the Mail on Sunday on October 22-23, 
2004.  See http://www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/DBD040101010_2.pdf 
2
 See http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/news/safeseats.htm 
3
 For example, see http://www.mori.com/mrr/2001/c010119.shtml.  Definitions vary across countries partly 
in accordance with electoral systems.  However, we suspect most are similarly traditional rather than 
„scientific‟.  
 2 
MP and the marginal nature of a constituency.  The primary objective of the current 
paper, therefore, is to ascertain the extent to which the reported data on the expense 
claims of MPs are consistent with a conventionally accepted definition of marginality.
4
  
Our contention is that there is a non-linear relationship between MPs‟ claims for 
expenses, assumed driven in large part by constituency service, and the size of the 
constituency majority.  The existence of a turning-point in an inverted U-shaped 
expenses/majority size relationship, beyond which the constituency is not regarded as 
„marginal‟, is implicit in this type of non-linearity.  In order to investigate this empirical 
relationship, the expense claims on categories of expenditure likely to be highly 
correlated with constituency service are used.  Two categories taken to reflect strongly 
this role are postage and stationery and both are used in the analysis conducted in this 
study.  It could be argued that electoral campaign expenses provide an alternative proxy 
measure that could be used in this context. However, this could be taken to capture more 
effectively the MP‟s effort at election time rather than reflect effort in terms of 
constituency service over the parliamentary tenure of the MP.  Thus, the use of the 
electoral campaign expenses measure is eschewed in the current study.
5
                 
 
This paper begins with a section describing the data used and its usefulness in the current 
context.  This is then followed by a section that explains the empirical methodology 
adopted.  The penultimate section of the paper reports the empirical results and a final 
section provides a summary and some concluding remarks.    
                                                 
4
 A recent article by Sam Coates, the chief political correspondent of The Times (issue dated Friday 26
th
 
October 2007, p.4), highlighted the fact that three Labour MPs in marginal constituencies claimed the 
largest amounts in expenses for the previous financial year, and emphasizes the relationship between MPs 
expenses and constituency „marginality‟      
5
 The estimated correlation coefficients between campaign expenses and the stationery and postage 
measures used in the current study are low indicating that the former is poor at capturing constituency 
service effort.   
 3 
Data 
 
In March 2001 the Review Body on Senior Salaries (SSRB) recommended fundamental 
changes to the way in which MPs are funded and reimbursed for their office expenses. In 
addition to salary and pension arrangements, MPs also receive a number of allowances 
including a staffing allowance, travel and car allowances, additional costs allowance and 
London supplement allowance. In 2004 the Speaker of the House of Commons decided, 
on the advice of the House of Commons Commission, that details of the expenses 
claimed by individual MPs for these allowances would be made available on the 
Parliamentary website.
6
  
 
The current study uses data on selected expenditures by Members of the House of 
Commons who were elected either at the UK General Election on the 7
th
 of June 2001 or 
at the subsequent six by-elections during the 2001-2005 parliamentary session.  As noted 
above, we focus on just two categories of expenditure – stationery and postage.  Though 
these may not be perfect measures that completely capture variations in constituency 
service, they have two distinct advantages.  First, they are easier to determine than other 
possible indicators: time spent in constituency surgeries would be an alternative measure 
but would pose considerable (possibly insuperable) problems in terms of data 
measurement and collection.  In contrast, we already have annual data available for 
Members on the cost of centrally purchased stationery for four financial years 2001/02, 
2002/03, 2003/04 and 2004/05 and on postage for two (2003/04 and 2004/05).   Second, 
the volume of correspondence between MPs and their constituents and (as a bi-product) 
between MPs and ministers has been considered an informative indicator by researchers 
interested in constituency service among British legislators (for example, see Norton and 
Wood (op.cit., pp.43-46) and Barker and Rush (op.cit.)). It is, of course, another matter 
whether such correspondence results in much more than reassurance, as opposed to 
changed outcomes, for constituents (see Rawlings (1990)) or whether the 
correspondence, and constituency service in general, actually eventuates in improved 
electoral performance for the MPs involved (see Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1991)). The 
                                                 
6
 Figures for the allowances claimed by each Member for each year since 2001/02 can be found at 
http://www.parliament.uk/site_information/allowances.cfm.   
 4 
important consideration is that MPs appear to think either it does or, in the event of a 
close electoral race, it might (see Barker and Rush (op.cit., p.177)). 
 
In addition to providing information on expenditures by MPs, the data supplied by the 
House of Commons contain some limited individual-level information. The variables 
used and their associated summary statistics are reported in table 1. The set of variables 
employed includes measures on length of service, gender, age, party affiliation and 
constituency size. The data on the MP‟s constituency majority are taken from The Daily 
Telegraph, General Election Supplement, Saturday the 9
th
 of June 2001. Data on the 
constituency majority at by-elections are taken from various issues of The Times 
newspaper. 
 
The empirical analysis is conducted using data pooled by cross-section and financial 
years from 2001/2 to 2004/5 for stationery (inclusive), and for just two years (2003/4 and 
2004/5) in the case of postage.  It can be seen from the first two rows of table 1 that 
expenditures vary widely across those MPs that report positive values for these items
7
, 
ranging from £36 to £38,750 for postage and from £4 to £13,841 for stationery over the 
relevant time periods. The second interesting feature of the data is that the size of the 
constituency majority also varies widely from a fragile 33 to a more formidable 21,949.  
This table also reveals large disparities in the age and length of service of MPs. 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 There were no expenditures reported for a small number of MPs.  For postage, seven and 14 MPs reported 
zero expenditures in 2003 and 2004 respectively.  For stationery, eight, four, seven and six MPs reported a 
zero expenditure for 2001, 2002, 2203, and 2004 respectively.  Given the use of a logarithmic 
transformation of the dependent variable (see text), these observations are not used in our empirical 
analysis.  The small degree of censoring of the dependent variable introduced through excluding these 
observations materially alters the empirical results reported in this paper. 
 5 
Empirical Methodology 
 
The methodology adopted in this paper exploits the ordinary least-squares (OLS) 
estimation procedure.  If we suppress the time subscript for ease of exposition, the 
expense amount claimed by the i
th
 MP can be defined as yi and the relationship expressed 
as follows: 
 
ln(yi) =  βx'i  + f(mi) + ui         i=1,….., N    [1] 
 
where ln() is the natural logarithm operator, xi is a vector of characteristics for the i
th
 MP, 
mi denotes the size of the majority, f() denotes the form of the relationship for mi (see 
below), β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, N is the sample size and ui  
is an error term for which conventional least-squares assumptions are made.
8
 The use of 
logarithms compresses the scale of the dependent variable, which is desirable given the 
range of the series in this case, and enables a more intuitive interpretation of the 
regression coefficients in terms of proportional changes.
 9
 
 
Although the data are panel in structure, almost all the explanatory variables are time 
invariant and this renders inappropriate the use of certain conventional panel estimators 
(e.g, the fixed effects estimator).  In addition, the short temporal dimension of the data 
(either two or four years) and the time invariant nature of the regressors also render 
infeasible use of Cochrane-Orcutt type corrections for the presence of autocorrelation.
10
       
                                                 
8
 A key assumption of primary concern in this study relates to the existence of a constant error variance in 
the regression model (i.e., the assumption of homoscedasticity).    
9 It is acknowledged that the choice of transformation for the dependent variable is not entirely 
straightforward and use of maximum likelihood estimated Box-Cox models (see Box and Cox (1964)) 
rejected both logged and non-logged forms for both expenditure categories.   However, this finding should 
not be construed as offering evidence in favour of the more general Box-Cox model. A further examination 
of comparable unadjusted-R
2
 values provided some tentative evidence favouring the logged form for the 
dependent variable for postage and the non-logged form for stationery (see table 2).         
10
 Beck and Katz (1995) suggest use of panel corrected standard errors on the basis of Monte Carlo 
simulation evidence. However, their analysis was cast in terms of relatively long time periods and none of 
the Monte Carlo evidence documented was conducted for applications where T was relatively short as in 
our case.  In addition, the time-invariant nature of the regressors in our application also poses problems for 
the use of such panel corrected standard errors.  We believe that in the current application, given that the 
number of cross-sectional units is extremely large relative to the time periods and dominate the variation in 
 6 
 
The hypothesis relating expenditure patterns to the size of the i
th
 MP‟s constituency 
majority is investigated through an explicit form assumed for f(mi).  Two approaches are 
used in this study to investigate the proposition of interest and these are now discussed in 
turn.  A quadratic form could be assumed for the relationship where: 
 
m m )f(m 2  i1i
2
i
                  [2] 
 
The estimated values obtained for 1 and 2 provide information on the nature of the 
relationship between expenditure and constituency majority size.  If both estimated 
values are well determined, this suggests the existence of a non-linear relationship and if 
1 > 0 and 2 < 0, then an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between the two variables.  
This could be taken to reflect, on average, rational behaviour on the part of MPs.  The 
size of the constituency majority at the stationary point of the inverted U-shaped 
relationship, computed using some basic differential calculus, is mstationary =  
2
1
2

.  This 
reveals the average constituency majority at which expenditures start to fall. The 
stationary or turning point can then be compared to the average number of votes cast per 
constituency to determine an empirical estimate for what constitutes a „marginal‟ 
constituency.    
 
The quadratic form is sometimes viewed as a rather blunt non-linear approximation. One 
criticism is that it allows the rise (as reflected in the linear term) to occur too slowly and 
the fall (the quadratic term) to occur too rapidly.  Thus, an alternative approach 
potentially useful in this context exploits linear splines.
11
  These replace the mi variable 
by a set of piece-wise linear segments allowing majority size to exert differential effects 
on expenditure patterns at different portions of the majority size distribution.  For 
example, if we assume for simplicity two linear segments, the form is expressed as:           
                                                                                                                                                 
the dependent variable, cross-sectional heteroscedasticity is likely to present the more significant 
econometric problem in need of address.             
11
 Gujarati, (2003, pp.317-319) offers a brief but accessible introduction to this topic.  Strictly speaking, 
the splines are piece-wise linear.  
 7 
 
i i2 i1i m*)Dm(m )f(m        [3] 
 
where m* is now a threshold value known as a knot (or node) determined in advance, and 
Di is a binary (or dummy) variable which equals 1 if  mi >  m* and 0 if mi ≤  m*. The 
estimated effect for 1 provides the average ceteris paribus effect of majority size on 
expenditure if the constituency majority falls within the first linear segment (i.e., is less 
than some value m*).  The sum of the estimated effects 1  +  2 provides the average 
effect of majority size on expenditure if the constituency majority falls within the second 
linear segment (i.e., is greater than some value m*).  The estimated effect corresponding 
to 2 provides a basis for testing whether there is a break in the empirical relationship at 
the threshold value m*.  The t-ratio corresponding to this estimate provides a statistical 
test for the differential in slopes between the two linear segments.  In our application the 
estimated effect for the first linear segment is anticipated to be positive and negative for 
the second.      
 
It is clear that the number of piece-wise linear splines could be increased to reflect the 
behaviour of the data but this proved unnecessary in the current application (see below).  
A key empirical issue in the implementation of the approach, however, relates to 
determining the optimal knots that delineate these segments.  In our case, the choice of 
knots and the number of splines is determined by experimentation with the final selection 
prompted by regression model goodness-of-fit considerations.  It is arguable that the 
reliance on a close coherence with the observed data in this approach renders it 
conceptually more persuasive than the quadratic form.  
 
              
 8 
Empirical Results 
 
Table 2 reports OLS estimates for a pair of specifications for each of the two expenditure 
categories.  As noted earlier, the data points for each MP are pooled across the short time 
period available.  The number of observations used in estimation is thus different since 
the data relating to the postage expenditure category are only available for two financial 
years.  The adjusted-R
2
 values, conveying information on the goodness-of-fit of the 
estimated regression models, are relatively modest in all cases. Given the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, the OLS standard errors are corrected using a sandwich estimator (see 
White (1980); Huber (1967)).   
 
Attention now turns to the estimated effects reported for the postage equation with an 
initial emphasis on the specification containing the linear and quadratic terms in 
constituency majority – see expression [2] above.  There is strong evidence of a gender 
differential in expenditure on this category (with male MPs spending about 20% less than 
female MPs), and postage expenditure tends to decline both with age and length of 
service, on average and ceteris paribus.  This may reflect the fact that older and longer 
serving MPs have well established networks that substitute for the type of constituency 
service captured by postage expenditure.  It is also consistent with the notion that 
younger and newer MPs are perhaps more enthusiastic and energetic in engaging in such 
constituency service.  This would accord with Norton and Wood‟s findings concerning 
the type of electoral cost-benefit analysis undertaken by MPs – though admittedly their 
evidence was relevant for Conservative rather than Labour MPs (see Norton and Wood, 
(op.cit., ch. 7)). 
 
There are differences in expenditure patterns across political parties. Labour MPs, on 
average and ceteris paribus, spent 56.7% more on postage than their Conservative 
counterparts.
12
  This may be attributable to the fact that the former are still likely to 
represent „[u]rban and poor rural constituencies [that] are generally assumed to generate 
                                                 
12
 Given the use of a logarithmic dependent variable and a binary dummy variable, the estimated Labour 
coefficient () is transformed as follows [exp() – 1]100 to yield the relevant percentage effect reported in 
the text.   
 9 
more casework than the more affluent suburban constituencies (Norton and Wood 
(op.cit., p.45))‟ generally represented by the latter, although some researchers suggest 
that this may be offset or even trumped by the greater willingness and capacity of more 
affluent voters to contact their MP by letter (see Barker and Rush (op.cit., p.231)). The 
difference between Labour and Conservative members could equally well be explained 
by the fact that, since the large (and continuing) influx of state-educated university 
graduates into the Labour ranks began in the 1960s, Labour MPs have a stronger ethic of 
professionalized welfare service (see Barker and Rush (op.cit., p.194) and Norton and 
Wood (op.cit., p.141)). But it may also reflect the Labour party‟s re-election strategy that 
encouraged MPs to dedicate considerable time to their constituencies in order to promote 
party policies and consolidate their electoral support (see Cowley at al. (2001)). This 
strategy, along with a widely assumed increase in both vulnerability and the proportion of 
„professional‟ or „career‟ politicians (see King (1981)) may render Norton and Wood‟s 
cost-benefit or „life-cycle‟ explanation as relevant now for the recent cohorts of Labour 
MPs as it was originally for earlier vintages of Conservative MPs.  The most important 
explanation, though, may be as Norton and Wood reasoned, „[t]he “in” party will be 
populated by more rational actors than it will when it is “out” (Norton and Wood (op.cit., 
p.191))‟.  The current crop of Labour MPs is now comprised of newer and younger 
individuals who, in the face of electoral defeat, clearly have something substantial to lose. 
 
A positive relationship is detected between postage and the size of the constituency, 
which represents a potential proxy for the workload of the MP.  For instance, on average 
and ceteris paribus, a rise of 1,000 in the size of the constituency raises expenditures on 
postage by 1.5%.   
  
Attention now turns to the estimated effects for the linear and quadratic terms in the 
constituency majority variable, which are both well determined and possess, a priori, the 
correct signs. The estimates appear consistent, on average, with rational behaviour on the 
part of MPs.  The size of the constituency majority at the stationary point corresponding 
to the inverted U-shaped relationship is computed at 7,048.  This indicates the average 
constituency majority at which postage expenditures by MPs initially start to fall.      
 10 
 
The coefficient estimates for the stationery expenditure category in column two of table 2 
are in broad comport with the estimates reported for the postage equation, though the 
differential in stationery expenditures between Labour and Conservative MPs is slightly 
attenuated.  There is evidence of a decline from the early years to the financial base year 
of 2003/4, and then an increase of about 8% in the subsequent financial year relative to 
this base year.  This could be taken to reflect the effect exerted on constituency service by 
the closer temporal proximity of a general election.  The linear term in the constituency 
majority is also slightly less well determined but achieves statistical significance at an 
acceptable 0.06 level.  The turning point computed using the relevant estimates in this 
column is somewhat lower than for the postage category, however, and suggests that, on 
average and ceteris paribus, stationery expenditures start to decline when the average 
majority exceeds 5,242 votes.
13
 
 
The final two columns of table 2 report estimates based on expression [3] to model the 
constituency majority.  After careful investigation
14
, two linear splines were found to best 
fit the data and the optimal knots were detected at majorities of 4,000 and 3,300 votes for 
the postage and stationery categories respectively.
15
 The estimated coefficients for the 
other controls, as compared to those reported for the models containing the linear and 
quadratic terms, appear invariant to the use of linear splines and thus warrant no further 
comment.   
 
The estimated effects for the splines are extremely well determined individually and, on 
the basis of priors, register correct signs in both specifications.  For instance, the point 
estimates for the first spline in both cases are positive and well determined.  The point 
estimates for the second spline (the sum of the two spline coefficients) in both cases are 
negative and well determined.  The estimated effects for the second spline are statistically 
                                                 
13
 The estimated turning points are 6,581 and 6,163 if the non-logged dependent variable is used for the 
postage and stationery categories respectively. 
14
 The knots were experimentally altered by 100 votes in turn and the models re-estimated.  The regression 
model that generated the highest unadjusted R
2
 was chosen and this yielded the knots reported in this study.     
15
 The optimal knots are 4,000 and 3,600 if the non-logged dependent variable is used for the postage and 
stationery categories respectively. 
 
 11 
different from zero in both specifications confirming the sharp change in average 
expenses‟ claim behaviour after the chosen knots.  The estimated effects suggest a 
sharper downturn in postage compared to stationery expenditures beyond the relevant 
knot.  In addition, the specifications containing the two linear splines fare slightly 
superior than the quadratic forms on the basis of the adjusted-R
2
 measures, though the 
increment in fit appears modest.                          
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The values computed for the turning points for the quadratic form and those chosen for 
the knots in the spline function can now be used to inform on the „marginal‟ status of the 
average constituency.  As noted earlier, it is conventional to classify a seat as „marginal‟ 
if the majority is less than 10% of the votes cast.  We now endeavour to assess the extent 
to which this provides an accurate benchmark for the classification of a „marginal‟ 
constituency given the observed expenditure behaviour of MPs.  The coefficient 
estimates reported here are based on mean (or sample average) regression estimates.  An 
average estimate for the votes cast per constituency in the 2001 General Election is thus 
required and is computed at 39,862.9.
16
                    
             
In the first instance we use estimates based on the quadratic relationship [2] for the 
postage category.  The turning point represents (7,048  39,862.9)100 = 17.7% of the 
votes cast suggesting that MPs, on average, appear more circumspect in their 
classification of a „marginal‟ constituency than the conventional „rule-of-thumb‟ when 
the quadratic form is used.  The estimates for the stationery expenditure category 
suggests a marginal constituency is defined in terms of (5,242  39,862.9)100 = 13.2% 
of the votes cast.   
 
                                                 
16
 The average electorate per constituency is 67,347.12 and the average turnout per constituency in the 2001 
general election was 0.5919016 in proportional terms.  The average number of votes cast per constituency 
is therefore 67347.12  0.5919016 = 39862.9. The electorate value used here is slightly different from that 
reported in table 1 given that the latter is based on those MPs that report positive expenditure values only.     
 12 
The knots optimally determined for the linear splines of expression [3] are also used to 
inform the „marginal‟ status of a constituency.  In regard to the postage category, the 
optimal knot is remarkably (4,000  39,862.9)100 = 10.0% of the votes cast, while for 
the stationery category it is (3,300  39,862.9)100 = 8.3%.17  On balance, and given a 
slight preference for the specifications containing the two linear splines on both 
conceptual and goodness-of-fit grounds, the expenditure behaviour of MPs appears 
broadly consistent with classifying „marginal‟ constituencies as those with majorities 
close to 10% of the total number of votes cast.                      
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The received wisdom among psephologists in the UK is that a parliamentary seat is 
interpretable as „marginal‟ if the majority is less than 10% of votes cast thus rendering 
the seat vulnerable on a swing of 5%. This appears a reasonable definition but data on the 
spending behaviour of MPs on selected expense categories can provide some assistance 
in empirically determining the validity of this convention.  The existence of a non-linear 
relationship between the expenses of MPs, assumed to be driven by the effort invested in 
constituency service, and the size of the constituency majority provides the basis for an 
empirical insight on this issue.  In particular, the point along the spectrum of the 
constituency majority that delineates a sign change in the spending behaviour of MPs can 
be exploited to assess the accuracy of the conventionally-used definition. 
 
This paper used econometric analysis to examine the relationship between the 
expenditures of MPs on postage and stationery and the size of a constituency majority 
allowing separately for two forms of non-linearity in the relationship.  The empirical 
approach adopted also allowed the interrogation of other factors assumed to 
independently influence the expense claims of MPs.  The analysis revealed an 
independent role for the gender of an MP and an inverse relationship between the 
expenses‟ categories and both the age and length of service of an MP.  Not surprisingly, 
                                                 
17
 This increases to (3,600  39,862.9)100 = 9.0% of votes cast if the non-logged form is used for the 
dependent variable in this case. 
 13 
the electoral size of a constituency exerted an important positive influence on expenditure 
outlays and Labour MPs, on average and ceteris paribus, spent over 57% and 48% more 
than their Tory counterparts on postage and stationery respectively.   
 
Two empirical forms were used to capture the relationship between the expense claim 
categories and majority size. The quadratic approximation provided well determined 
effects for both the linear and quadratic terms and yielded turning points that situated a 
„marginal‟ constituency between 13% (using stationery) and 18% (using postage) of 
votes cast.  In contrast, the use of two linear splines suggested the classification of a 
„marginal‟ constituency at 8.3% (using stationery) and 10% (using postage) of votes cast.  
The regression model goodness-of-fit criteria revealed a very mild preference for the 
specifications exploiting the linear splines and this form could also be viewed as 
conceptually more persuasive. In addition, given some very mild evidence suggesting a 
case for the use of a non-logged form for the stationery model with splines, the 
classification is placed at 9.0% of votes cast using the non-logged dependent variable (see 
footnotes 15 and 17).   
 
It is arguable that we have not captured all relevant factors that determine constituency 
service and thus the regression model could be interpreted as potentially mis-specified, 
though the econometric evidence on this is ambiguous.
18
  For instance, the level of 
deprivation within a given constituency might be one such factor.  However, it could be 
argued in defense of the specifications used that the political affiliation of an MP crudely 
proxies these types of factors with Labour MPs, as noted above, more likely to represent 
deprived and poorer constituencies.
19
 Thus, we take the view that the empirical evidence 
reported here, based on the actual expenditure behaviour of MPs, provides some 
empirical support for the conventionally used definition of a „marginal‟ constituency.  
                                                 
18
  We used the RESET with predictions raised to the fourth power (see Ramsey (1969)) to investigate 
model mis-specification.  This is generally viewed as a relatively weak test but suggested no problem in 
regard to the stationery measure with prob-values of 0.98 and 0.93 for the quadratic and spline models 
respectively.  In contrast, the results were more border-line for the postage measure with the prob-values 
0.056 and 0.46 respectively.      
19
 This issue could be interrogated further by using the 2001 Census data to construct constituency-level 
deprivation indicators, and using these as additional regressors in the estimated regression models. This 
approach goes beyond the scope of the current paper.     
 14 
Assuming variations in postage and stationery capture constituency service, and 
assuming the latter varies with the „safeness‟ of a parliamentary seat, conventional 
wisdom appears to be borne out in the average behaviour of MPs.  However, our 
empirical results do not preclude the possibility that such behaviour is actually driven by 
conventional wisdom or what new „institutionalists‟ refer to as a „logic of 
appropriateness‟.20                         
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Table 1:  Variable Description and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Variable Description Obs. Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Postage The cost of postage associated with the use of stationery. 
This includes the postage element for any pre-paid 
envelopes ordered from the central supplier for use in 
direct connection with a Member‟s parliamentary duties. 
1292 3636.514 3910.009 36 38750 
Centrally 
Purchased 
Stationery 
The cost of stationery items ordered from a central 
supplier. This includes stationery with pre-paid postage 
for use in direct connection with a Member‟s 
parliamentary duties. 
2598 1212.403 1127.539 4 13841 
Male = 1 if individual Member is male: = 0 otherwise. 2598 0.8187 N/A 0 1 
Age The age of the individual Member in years as at 1 April 
2005. 
2598 53.420 8.729 30 80 
Length of 
Service 
The length of continuous service in the House of 
Commons (in months) 
2598 147.997 92.548 6.1 521.067 
Labour = 1 if individual is affiliated to the Labour Party; = 0 
otherwise. 
2598 0.622 N/A 0 1 
Conservative = 1 if individual is affiliated to the Conservative Party; = 
0 otherwise. 
2598 0.248 N/A 0 1 
Liberal 
Democrats 
= 1 if individual is affiliated to the Liberal Democratic 
Party; = 0 otherwise. 
2598 0.082 N/A 0 1 
Other = 1 if individual‟s party affiliation is other than Labour, 
Conservative and Liberal Democrats; = 0 otherwise. 
2598 0.048 N/A 0 1 
Majority The individual Member‟s majority at the General 
Election 7 June 2001 and for six by-elections during the 
Parliament 2001-2005. 
2598 8437.463 4569.02 33 21949 
Electorate The size of the Member‟s constituency at the General 
Election 7 June 2001 and for six by-elections during the 
Parliament 2001-2005. 
2598 67419.87 8445.48 21807 106305 
Notes to table 2: (1) N/A denotes not applicable given the discrete nature of the variable.  
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Table 2: Determinants of Selected Categories of Discretionary Expenditure by MPs 
Variables Ln(Postage) Ln(Stationery) Ln(Postage) Ln(Stationery) 
Constant   7.7370*** 
 (0.2724) 
  6.4370*** 
 (0.1666) 
 7.5409*** 
(0.2966) 
 6.2661*** 
(0.1795) 
Male  -0.2029*** 
 (0.0634) 
 -0.1616*** 
 (0.0375) 
-0.2181*** 
(0.0633) 
-0.1701*** 
(0.0374) 
Age (years)  -0.0211*** 
 (0.0035) 
 -0.0196*** 
 (0.0021) 
-0.0243*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0197*** 
(0.0021) 
Length of Service 
(months) 
 -0.0006* 
 (0.0003) 
 -0.0003 
 (0.0002) 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Labour   0.4491*** 
 (0.0554) 
  0.3903*** 
 (0.0359) 
 0.4533*** 
(0.0554) 
 0.3942*** 
(0.0360) 
Liberal Democrats   0.2829*** 
 (0.0734) 
  0.2688*** 
 (0.0482) 
 0.3081*** 
(0.0755) 
 0.2845*** 
(0.0492) 
Other  -0.1771 
 (0.1347) 
-0.1909** 
 (0.0841) 
-0.1597 
(0.1289) 
-0.1761** 
(0.0826) 
Conservative Base Category Base Category Base Category Base Category 
Financial Year 
2001/2 
Not applicable  0.1402*** 
(0.0381) 
Not applicable  0.1400*** 
(0.0380) 
Financial Year 
2002/3 
Not applicable  0.1569*** 
(0.0380) 
Not applicable  0.1568*** 
(0.0379) 
Financial Year 
2003/4 
Base Category Base Category Base Category Base Category 
Financial Year 
2004/5 
  0.0758* 
 (0.0446) 
 0.0829** 
(0.0410) 
 0.0759* 
(0.0444) 
 0.0830** 
(0.0408) 
Electorate 1000   0.0153*** 
 (0.0028) 
 0.0187*** 
(0.0018) 
 0.0152*** 
(0.0028) 
 0.0186*** 
(0.0018) 
Constituency 
Majority    
  0.0561*** 
 (0.0168) 
 0.0195* 
(0.0104) 
Not applicable Not applicable 
[Constituency 
Majority]
2
  
-3.98e-09 *** 
 (8.39e-10) 
-1.86e-09*** 
(5.26e-10) 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Constituency 
Majority < 4000 
Not applicable Not applicable   0.000134*** 
(0.000031) 
Not applicable 
Constituency 
Majority  4000 
Not applicable Not applicable  -0.0001695*** 
 (0.0000337) 
Not applicable 
Constituency 
Majority < 3300 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable  0.0000951*** 
(0.0000233) 
Constituency 
Majority  3300 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable -0.0001186*** 
(0.00000248) 
Observations 1292 2598 1292 2598 
Adjusted-R
2
 0.1626 0.1682 0.1679 0.1717 
Ratio of R
2 Values 1.069 0.946 1.045 0.943 
Heteroscedasticity 2  29.4576*** 45.465*** 29.716*** 36.372*** 
Notes to table 2:  (1) ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively using two-
tailed tests.   (2) „Base category‟ denotes the reference group used in estimation when there is a set of mutually 
exclusive binary categories. (3) „Not applicable‟ denotes not relevant for the estimation model reported.  (4)  Robust 
standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity of unknown form using the White(1980)/Huber(1967) adjustment. 
(5) The homoscedasticity test reported is based on White (1980). (6). The R2 values from models with logged and non-
logged dependent variables are not comparable. The „Ratio of R2 Values‟ computes comparable R2 values and 
expresses them as the ratio of the logged to non-logged R2. A ratio in excess of unity favours the logged dependent 
variable model (see Ramanathan, 1995, p. 275). (7) The estimated effect reported for the second spline represents the 
differential in slopes between the two linear splines (see expression [3] and related discussion in the text).   
